How does system-level information impact the ability of an adversary to degrade performance in a networked control system? How does the complexity of an adversary's strategy affect its ability to degrade performance? This paper focuses on these questions in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can influence a given fraction of the agents in the system. Focusing on the class of ring graphs, we explicitly highlight how both (i) the complexity of the attack strategies and (ii) the knowledge of the graph structure and agent identities can be leveraged by an adversary to degrade system performance. We study four types of adversarial influence with varying degrees of knowledge and complexity. We find these models can be ranked: complex and informed adversaries can inflict more harm to the system whereas simple and uninformed adversaries have the least ability to inflict damage.
I. INTRODUCTION
A multiagent system can be viewed as a collection of decision-making entities that are pre-programmed with a control strategy specifying decisions for all potential observations. These observations could convey information regarding the local environment, as well as information regarding the behavior of other agents in the system. Regardless of the specific problem domain and informational characteristics, the underlying goal is to derive agent control policies that ensure that the emergent collective behavior is desirable with respect to a system-level performance metric.
There are several results in the literature on networked control systems that provide strong guarantees on the quality of emergent outcomes under the condition that all agents follow the prescribed control policies, e.g. consensus and flocking [2] , [3] , sensor allocation [4] , [5] , coordination of unmanned vehicles [6] , and others. Here, the fact that an agent's control policy is influenced by the behavior of other agents may create risks with regards to adversarial interventions. Accordingly, in this paper we ask whether an adversary can exploit these interconnections to negatively influence the quality of the emergent collective behavior. A body of work providing formal analyses of this interplay has emerged in recent years, often in the context of robust consensus, distributed optimization, and cyber-physical system security [7] - [9] .
The baseline control strategy that we consider in this paper originates from the game theoretic literature on distributed This research was supported by UCOP grant LFR-18-548175, ONR grant #N00014-17-1-2060 and NSF grant #ECCS-1638214. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [1] . The current paper extends the results by fully characterizing dynamic adversarial influence.
B. Canty is with CACI International. K. Paarporn, M. Alizadeh, and J.R. Marden control [10] - [13] . One approach in this literature that has received significant research attention is (i) assigning each agent a local objective function that is equal to the agent's marginal contribution to the true system-level objective and (ii) assigning each agent a probabilistic distributed learning rule such as log-linear learning [14] - [16] . The allure of this approach is that it guarantees that the emergent collective behavior will optimize the system-level objective (in an asymptotic sense) for a broad class of multiagent systems [17] . However, the susceptibility of this approach to adversarial interventions is generally unknown.
This paper evaluates the impact of adversarial interventions on emergent behaviors for a class of games known as graphical coordination games [18] , [19] . In a graphical coordination game, each agent selects a convention and derives a benefit for this selection that depends on how many of the agent's neighbors (in a graph theoretic sense) have selected the same convention. We focus on the case where there are only two conventions called x and y, and the potential benefit derived from x is strictly greater than the potential benefit from y. Note this does not imply that an agent should always choose x; rather, an agent's best convention choice relies on the choices of its neighbors. It is well-known that for any graphical coordination game, the asymptotic behavior when agents follow log-linear learning optimizes social welfare, irrespective of the underlying graph topology [20] .
Within the framework of graphical coordination games, we consider a scenario in which an adversarial actor can manipulate the decision-making process of selected agents in the system. It does so by attaching one external node, fixed in its convention to either x or y, to each of the selected agents. In effect, each of the influenced agents have an additional "impostor" neighbor node that is fixed in its choice. The adversary's objective is to minimize the asymptotic system efficiency given a budget of impostor nodes to allocate. The overarching concept we seek to highlight in this paper is the relation between the complexity of the adversary's strategy, the level of the adversary's knowledge about the system, and the degradation of efficiency in the overall system.
To illustrate this relation, we consider adversarial policies with two levels of complexity. In 1) static policies, the adversary a priori selects a subset of agents and the types of the impostor nodes. This subset is fixed for all times, i.e. it does not change as the agents continue to update their decisions. In 2) dynamic policies, the adversary is able to change and/or randomize its selection over time. We also consider two levels of adversarial knowledge. The adversary is a) uninformed if it does not know the underlying interactions between the agents and cannot observe their decisions. An b) informed adversary knows the underlying interaction graph and observes agents' , and (c), resp.). γ ∈ (0, 1] is the fraction of agents in the network it can influence with impostor nodes. For low budgets (γ ≈ 0), information does not help an adversary degrade system efficiency. However, complexity of the policy has a significant impact on potential degradation -in (a), a dynamic adversary can degrade efficiency by 1 − 1 1+α = 0.2308 compared to a static adversary. When the budget is high (γ ≈ 1), information significantly helps an adversary degrade efficiency -in (a), an informed adversary can degrade efficiency by 1 1+α − 4+α 6(1+α) = 0.2179 compared to an uninformed adversary. Meanwhile, adversarial complexity has relatively no impact on degradation. We note the characterization of minimum efficiencies for informed adversaries does not admit a closed-form expression in general. Plotted here (dotted lines) are close approximations to the actual minimum efficiencies -see Section VI for details. decisions. We focus on characterizing the minimum efficiency four different adversarial models can induce on the system: 1a) static and uninformed, 1b) static and informed, 2a) dynamic and uninformed, and 2b) dynamic and informed. Figure 1 summarizes our results and the relation between complexity (static vs dynamic), information (informed vs uninformed), and the maximal damage that can be inflicted. We find the performance of the adversarial policies can be ranked, where static uninformed policies inflict the least damage and dynamic informed policies inflict the most damage to the system. System-level information is valuable to the adversary if it has a sufficiently large budget, while the ability to implement complex strategies increases an adversary's impact if its budget is low.
Questions of how adversarial influence can affect emergent behavior associated with log-linear learning were initially posed in [21] , [22] . The focus centered on whether the adversary could steer the dynamics towards an inefficient Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we focus instead on adversarial strategies that minimize the system-level objective (i.e. minimize social welfare) on the class of ring graphs. The value of this characterization is it begins to shed light on how systemlevel information can be exploited by an adversary to harm the system. This characterization in turn may inform a system operator as to what information should be obfuscated from potential adversaries in order to protect system behavior.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. Graphical coordination games
A graphical coordination game is played between a set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} interacting over a connected undirected graph G = (N , E) with node set N and edge set E ⊂ N × N . The set of neighbors of agent i ∈ N is N i = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. Agent i has an action set A i = {x, y} and derives a benefit from each neighbor j ∈ N i according to the following symmetric payoff matrix V :
where the payoff gain α > 0 is a parameter that captures the benefit of coordinating on action x as opposed to action y. In a graphical coordination game, the benefit to agent i, denoted by U i : A → R, is the total payoff derived from the pairwise interactions, i.e.,
where A = A 1 × · · · × A n denotes the set of joint actions and a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) denotes the actions of all agents other than agent i. The quality of a joint action profile a ∈ A can be captured by the welfare:
or in other words, the sum of all agents' payoffs in a. We define the efficiency of profile a ∈ A as
which measures the quality of a relative to the welfaremaximizing action profile. Depending on the graph structure, there may exist several Nash equilibria. Regardless of the graph, the all x action profile x is a Nash equilibrium as well as the welfare maximizer: η( x) = 1. The all y profile is also a Nash equilibrium that gives a suboptimal efficiency η( y) = 1 1+α .
B. Log-linear Learning
Log-linear learning is a distributed stochastic algorithm governing the evolution of players' decisions over time [12] , [15] , [17] , [23] - [25] . It is essentially a noisy best-response dynamic -with high probability, each player updates their action to maximize their local utility function. Specifically, the algorithm produces a sequence of joint action profiles {a(t)} ∞ t=0 , determined in the following way. Assume a(0) ∈ A is arbitrarily determined. Then:
• At time t ≥ 1, select any agent i ∈ N uniformly at random. • Agent i selects its action at time t = 1, 2, . . . probabilistically according to
Pr [a i (t) = y] = e βUi(y,a−i(t−1)) e βUi(x,a−i(t−1)) + e βUi(y,a−i(t−1)) (4) where β > 0 is a given algorithm parameter. • All other agents repeat their previous action, i.e.,
For any β > 0, the log-linear learning process is known to induce an ergodic Markov chain over state space A, with a unique static distribution µ β ∈ ∆(A). The stochastically stable states are the action profiles in the support of the limiting distribution: a ∈ A is stochastically stable if µ(a) = lim β→∞ µ β (a) > 0. Such a distribution exists and is unique [17] .
III. MODELS OF ADVERSARIAL INFLUENCE
Within the setting of graphical coordination games, an adversarial actor seeks to induce a stochastically stable state that minimizes system efficiency. To do so, the adversary can select a subset of agents and attach one x or y impostor node to each agent in the subset. An impostor node acts as a neighbor with a fixed convention choice. We call S x ⊆ N (resp. S y ) the set of agents that are connected to an impostor x node (resp. y). It holds that S x ∩ S y = ∅. Under the influence of impostors, the perceived utility of any agent i ∈ N is
where for shorthand we use S xy to mean the pair (S x , S y ). An agent i ∈ S x (resp. i ∈ S y ) experiences the usual benefits from its neighbors in N i as well as an additional utility of 1 + α if a i = x (resp. 1 if a i = y). We call S xy the influence set.
The adversary has a budget on how many impostors it can allocate. We call γ ∈ (0, 1] the adversary's fractional budget. It can allocate up to γn impostors to a graph of n agents. An influence set hence must satisfy |S x | + |S y | ≤ γn . We denote I( γn ) as the set of all influence sets satisfying these properties.
An adversarial policy π : A × G n → ∆(I( γn )) assigns a probability distribution π(a, G) on feasible influence sets contingent on an action profile and underlying interaction graph. Here, G n is the set of all undirected connected graphs of n agents. The influence set S xy (t) applied to the system at time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . is drawn from π(a(t), G). We call Π( γn ) the set of all adversarial policies. We next specify how a policy modifies the log-linear learning dynamics to generate the sequence of states a(0), a(1), a(2), . . ..
A. Log-linear learning under adversarial influence
Under any adversarial policy π, agents follow a modified version of the log-linear learning update rule specified in (4) . Specifically, the benefit functions U i (z, a −i (t − 1)) (z = x, y) that appear in (4) are replaced with the perceived utilities U i (z, a −i (t−1); S xy (t−1)), given by (5) . Given the interaction graph G, payoff gain α, and adversarial policy π, we denote the set of stochastically stable states as LLL(G, α, π).
We next define four types of adversarial policies ranging in levels of complexity (static vs dynamic) and knowledge (uninformed vs informed).
B. Four models of adversarial influence
A static uninformed policy π SU is an adversarial policy that satisfies π SU (a, G) = π SU (a , G ), ∀a, a ∈ A and G, G ∈ G n , and |supp(π SU (a, G))| = 1, ∀a ∈ A and G ∈ G n .
where supp(·) is the support of a probability distribution (the set of elements with non-zero probability). In words, π SU assigns a single, static, and deterministic influence set S xy ∈ I( γn ). The assignment cannot depend on the graph structure -hence it must be applied to every possible graph. The adversary is essentially uninformed of the interaction graph. We call Π SU ( γn ) the set of all static uninformed policies. A static informed policy π SI satisfies π SI (a, G) = π SI (a , G), ∀a, a ∈ A and G ∈ G n and |supp(π SI (a, G))| = 1, ∀a ∈ A and G ∈ G n ,
While the chosen influence set S xy still cannot randomize nor adapt to changing action profiles, a static informed policy can assign a different influence set for every possible graph. Essentially, the adversary is informed of the interaction graph. We call Π SI ( γn ) the set of all static informed policies. More complex adversarial policies may be able to change and/or randomize the influence set. A dynamic uninformed policy π DU satisfies π DU (a, G) = π DU (a, G ), ∀a ∈ A and G, G ∈ G n . (9) Here, the adversary may assign a different distribution for each action profile, but is uninformed of the interaction graph in the same sense as a static uninformed adversary. We call Π DU ( γn ) the set of all static uninformed policies. Lastly, a dynamic informed policy π DI can assign a different distribution for each action profile as well as for each graph. We thus have Π DI ( γn ) = Π( γn ): the set of dynamic informed policies is the set of all adversarial policies. From the above four definitions, we can deduce that
The adversary seeks to induce a stochastically stable state with minimal efficiency. We next define an adversarial performance metric for each of the four policies.
C. Adversarial performance metric on large ring graphs
For tractability, we focus on the above four types of policies applied to large ring graphs. By this we mean the agents are arranged in a ring configuration and the number of agents n tends to infinity. We call R n the set of all ring graphs whose vertices are N . Each element of R n is simply a ring graph with a different permutation of the indices N . We define the performance of the adversarial model X ∈ {SU, SI, DU, DI} as η(a). (11) In words, this is the minimum efficiency the adversary can induce among best case (from the perspective of system efficiency) ring graphs of n nodes and among stochastically stable states. For uninformed policies, a best case ring graph arranges an influence set in a way that minimizes harm to the system. Informed adversaries can specify an influence set regardless of which ring graph is used. As the number of agents tends to infinity, we are interested in characterizing the following performance metric:
The action profiles that give low efficiencies are ones that have as many mis-coordinating edges as possible. Such configurations are characterized by short, alternating x and y segments along the ring. They can induce efficiencies lower than the suboptimal Nash equilibrium y, i.e. lower than η( y) = 1 1+α . In the forthcoming sections, we provide characterizations of (12) for all four adversarial models and for all parameters α ∈ (0, 1), γ ∈ [0, 1].
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF STATIC ADVERSARIES
From (10), we immediately deduce η SI (α, γ) ≤ η SU (α, γ) for any gain α ∈ (0, 1) and fractional budget γ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, a static informed adversary can always implement a static uninformed policy, and hence inflicts at least as much damage as a static uninformed adversary. Furthermore, both η SU (α, γ) and η SI (α, γ) are decreasing functions of γ since an adversary can always implement a strategy meeting a lower budget if it has more resources available. Our first result characterizes the minimal efficiency a static uninformed adversary can induce. is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum efficiency a static uninformed adversary can induce (in the sense of (12)) is
The above efficiency is achieved when γ x = 0 and γ y = γ, where γ x (γ y ) are the fraction of agents influenced by an x (y) impostor.
Theorem 4.1 asserts a static uninformed adversary should never assign x impostor nodes. A static uninformed adversary can never induce an efficiency lower than η( y) = 1 1+α . Here, the reduction in efficiency relies on what fraction of the network the uninformed adversary can convert to y. For γ ≤ α, it cannot convert any agent to play y. For γ > α, the fraction it can convert linearly increases up to one. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Our next result characterizes η SI (α, γ), the minimum efficiency a static informed adversary can induce.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose the adversarial budget γ ∈ (0, 1] is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum efficiency a static informed adversary can induce (in the sense of (12)) is
s 1 ≥ 0 with x2 , y2 = 0, or s 1 > 0 and s 2 < 0 (14) where [z] + = max{z, 0} for any z ∈ R. When γ = 1, the efficiency can be written
where l * y = min{l ∈ Z ≥0 : l = α(l + 1) + 3}.
The solution to the above optimization problem gives the minimum efficiency a static informed adversary can induce. If an exact solution exists, i.e. for finite ( * x1 , * y1 , * x2 , * y2 ), the optimizers describe the lengths of alternating and repeated x and y segments in a stabilizable action profile. The first two constraints are minimal required lengths for such x and y segments. The number of repetitions of each pattern ( * xκ , * yκ ) is given by numbers r κ ∈ Z ≥0 , κ = 1, 2, that satisfy r 1 s * 1 + r 2 s * 2 = 0. The s κ variables describe adversarial "surpluses" for each segment pattern, i.e. the difference between adversaries available to an x and y segment from the budget γ and the minimum number of adversaries required to stabilize the segments. Appendix A outlines a series of arguments leading up to a proof of Theorem 4.2.
The minimum efficiency η SI (α, γ) in general does not admit a closed-form expression. By relaxing the integer constraints on the optimization variables x1 , y1 , x2 , and y2 one can obtain a lower bound η * SI (α, γ) ≤ η SI (α, γ). However due to space constraints, we do not provide an explicit expression here for the lower bound η * SI . We refer the reader to [1] (Thm. 4.3) for such an expression.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF DYNAMIC ADVERSARIES From (10), we immediately deduce η DI (α, γ) ≤ η DU (α, γ) for any gain α ∈ (0, 1) and fractional budget γ ∈ [0, 1]. In words, a dynamic uninformed adversary inflicts at least as much damage as a static uninformed adversary. The proofs of the results in this section are provided in Appendices D and E. They rely heavily on the theory of regularly perturbed Markov processes and resistance trees [26] , [27] . A brief overview is given in Appendix C. The result below characterizes the minimal efficiency a dynamic uninformed adversary can induce.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the adversarial budget γ ∈ (0, 1] is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum efficiency a dynamic uninformed adversary can induce (in the sense of (12)) is
This above efficiency is achieved by when γ x = 0 and γ y = γ.
Similarly to optimal static uninformed policies (Theorem 4.1), an optimal dynamic uninformed policy never assigns x impostors. Note that (16) is independent of the budget γ, which suggests an important qualitative difference between static and dynamic uninformed adversaries: an uninformed adversary with low budget can influence behavior far more effectively if it is capable of employing a dynamic, randomized strategy when compared with a fixed, deterministic one. The proof is provided in Appendix E.
Our next result characterizes η DI (α, γ) -the minimal efficiency that can be induced by a dynamic informed adversary.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose the adversarial budget γ ∈ (0, 1] is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum efficiency a dynamic informed adversary can induce (in the sense of (12)) is
For a fixed α, the lowest minimum efficiency possible is achieved on an interval of γ values. Specifically,
where
The difference in the above formulation from (14) is in the surplus variables s κ . Here, each y (x) segment requires only two impostors (two or zero) to stabilize. Consequently, a dynamic informed adversary is able to induce a lower efficiency than a static informed one given the same budget. However, it is worth noting from (18) that a dynamic informed adversary can never inflict more damage than a static informed adversary possessing a full budget (γ = 1). It induces the same lowest minimal efficiency η SI (α, 1) for any budget γ ≥ γ sat .
The proof, provided in Appendix D, essentially hinges on finding a dynamic policy that can stabilize feasible action profiles satisfying the first two constraints of (17) with the fewest number of impostors. Note that these constraints coincide with those for static informed policies (14) . Hence, the result of Theorem 5.2 asserts dynamic informed policies can stabilize the same action profiles with fewer impostors as a static informed policy can.
The minimum efficiency η DI (α, γ) in general admits no closed-form expression. By relaxing the integer constraints in (17) , one can obtain a lower bound η * DI (α, γ) ≤ η DI (α, γ). However, we omit presenting the explicit expression of this lower bound due to space limitations.
VI. DISCUSSION AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
Informed adversarial policies reduce system efficiency by strategically placing both x and y adversaries along the ring graph. By stabilizing short alternating x and y segments, system efficiency suffers due to non-coordinating edges. Uninformed adversaries cannot stabilize such alternating patterns because they cannot identify the agents that compose these patterns. The most damage they can hope to do is to send only y impostors in order to stabilize a fraction of the network to y. Hence, the lowest efficiency they can induce is 1 1+α which occurs in the all y action profile.
In general, the characterizations (14) and (17) for informed adversaries may not always admit finite optimizers. To characterize upper bounds on the true values η SI (α, γ) and η DI (α, γ), we rely on numerical simulations that exhaustively search over segments up to a finite maximum length max . Denotẽ η X (α, γ; max ) as the resulting value from such a search for X ∈ {SI, DI}. Then we will haveη X (α, γ; max ) ≥ η X (α, γ) for any α, γ, and max . This upper bound becomes tighter the larger the maximum search length max is. Additionally, we note the value η SI (α, 1) given by (15) serves as a universal lower bound for η X (α, γ). From Figure 1 , we see this lower bound becomes tighter as γ increases. From (15) and (18), we know this lower bound is achieved for sufficiently high γ.
We have compiled in Figure 2a and 2b the resulting values ofη X (α, γ; max ) (X ∈ {SI, DI}) and their optimizers ( x1 , y1 , x2 , y2 ) for selected α, γ parameters. We chose a maximum segment length of max = 500. We have also displayed the lower bound values η * X obtained by solving realnumber relaxations of (14) and (17) . An explicit form of this lower bound for static informed is reported in [1] . One for dynamic informed can be derived in a similar manner. We observe the lower and upper bounds are quite close for all parameters tested. This indicates the upper boundsη X are very tight for high segment search lengths. An illustrative example of the computed static informed policy for α = 0.3, γ = 0.5 is depicted in Figure 2c . The parameter r is the number of instances the first segment pattern ( x 1 , y 1 ) appears for every instance of the second segment pattern ( x 2 , y 2 ). The value η * SI is the lower bound computed by relaxing the integer constraints in (14) . We observe these values are very close to the upper bounds. (b) A compilation of optimizers that give the upper boundηDI(α, γ; 500) for selected values of α, γ. (c) A static informed adversary's optimal policy when α = 0.3, γ = 0.5 is on a 34-agent ring graph. It gives an efficiency of 0.6946. The agents in the system are circles arranged in a ring graph. The labels (and color) on the agents indicate their decision in the unique stochastically stable state given the influence set (blue = y, green = x). The 17 impostor nodes are depicted as circles inside the ring that attach to selected agents in the network. The influence set induces a repeating pattern of x and y segments in the stochastically stable state. The ( x 1 , y 1 ) segment pattern repeats 2 times for each appearance of a ( x 2 , y 2 ) pattern. The adversary's allocation stabilizes these segments with the minimum required adversaries -details are given in Lemma A.2. As the number of agents tends to infinity, repeating this 34-agent pattern indefinitely still yields the same efficiency of 0.6946. A dynamic adversary can induce lower efficiency because it can stabilize the same pattern with strictly fewer impostor nodes. From Theorem 5.2 it needs only two impostors for each y segment and zero impostors for each x segment in this example. Thus, it can stabilize the configuration with a budget of only γ = 6/34 = 0.1764.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the susceptibility of distributed game-theoretic learning rules to adversarial influences in the context of graphical coordination games. We considered adversaries with varying degrees of knowledge and strategy complexity. An important insight gleaned from the analysis is that an adversary with a low resource budget does not benefit much from system-level information. However, a higher level of complexity in the adversary's implementation can increase its impact. On the other hand, information can be leveraged to significantly increase an adversary's impact if it has a larger budget.
While the results in this paper are adversarial-centric, these findings provide insight as to what system-level information should be obfuscated from potential adversarial actors to protect system behavior. Our focus is limited here to graphical coordination games. Future work will be devoted to characterizing this interplay in other distributed multi-agent systems of interest across disciplines in science and engineering.
APPENDIX A STATIC INFORMED ADVERSARIES
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.2. The arguments here primarily rely on the fact the graphical coordination game is a potential game. We provide a brief overview of potential games here.
A. Preliminaries on Potential games
A game is a potential game [28] if there exists a function φ : A → R such that for any agent i ∈ N and action profiles a, a ∈ A,
In words, the individual agent incentives are aligned with a global objective -the potential function φ. The graphical coordination game without adversarial influence has a potential function given by φ(a) := W (a) 2 -individual incentives are aligned with social welfare. With a static policy π that selects influence set S xy , the graphical coordination game has a potential function given by
In potential games, the stochastically stable states of the loglinear learning process are the action profiles that maximize the potential function [29] , [30] . Under a static informed policy π that assigns influence set S xy to the ring graph G, they can be expressed as LLL(G, α, π) = arg max a∈A φ(a; S xy ).
B. Proof of Theorem 4.2
A static informed adversary knows the underlying interaction graph and can strategically select the influence set depending on how the agents are arranged in the ring (8) . Without loss of generality, we assume the underlying ring graph is the one in which N i = {i − 1, i + 1} (applying modular n arithmetic when necessary) for all i ∈ N . We introduce some convenient notation. For any subset B ⊆ N of agents and any action profile a ∈ A, let a B = {a i : i ∈ B} correspond to the action choices associated with the group B in the action profile a. Accordingly, we define the potential function restricted to the set B as
(23) Any action profile consists of contiguous x and y segments of varying lengths along the ring graph. Accordingly, we will represent an action profile by a = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L m }, where each |L k | ≥ 1 and they are of the form L k = {x, . . . , x} or {y, . . . , y}. We say L k = X (Y ) to mean the segment is of type x (y). The segments are alternating in type. By definition, we have m k=1 |L k | = n. The approach we take is to identify the minimal lengths of alternating x and y segments along the ring graph, and the conditions under which such configurations are stabilizable under static adversarial influence. The first lemma rules out certain configurations as candidates for stochastically stable states.
Lemma A.1. If a is stochastically stable, then x segments are length 2 or greater and y segments are length 3 or greater.
Proof. We need to show any instance xyx, xyyx, or yxy can never be stabilized for any choice of S x and S y . We focus on the case xyx, meaning that there exists a set of agents B = {i, i+1, i+2} such that a B = (x, y, x). Now, consider the profile a = (a B , a −B ) where a B = (x, x, x). A calculation yields φ(a; S xy ) − φ(a ; S xy ) = φ(a B ; S xy ) − φ(a B ; S xy ), (24) For any sets S xy , it holds that φ(a B , S xy ) < φ(a B , S xy ). Hence a is not stochastically stable. Similar arguments can be constructed for the other cases as well.
We thus only consider action profiles satisfying the above criterion as candidates for stochastically stable states. Our next lemma begins the process of understanding how many adversaries are necessary to stabilize y-segments of varying length. We first introduce the following notation. For a given action profile a = {L 1 , . . . , L m }, let Q(k) ⊆ N be the player indices of the k-th segment. Assumption 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume only y adversaries are applied to y segments and x adversaries to x segments in a stabilizable action profile a.
The next result identifies the minimal number of adversaries necessary to ensure stability of isolated x and y segments.
Lemma A.2. The profile a is the unique stochastically stable state if and only if for every segment L 1 , . . . , L m ,
Proof. For compactness, we present the proof only for y segments, as the arguments for x segments are completely analogous. For shorthand, we express the y segment with xy |L k | x, which indicates the two neighboring x players. We first prove necessity -suppose a is the unique stochastically stable state. Then
which results in (25) .
To ensure sufficiency, we need to design an S y satisfying |Q(k) ∩ S y | = α(|L k | + 1) + 3 while ensuring that
(28) Any other group action profile a Q(k) can be classified into one of the following three types.
• Type 1: y c x d y e , c, d, e > 0, c + d + e = |L k |, which we call a cluster of x within Q(k). Condition (28) is satisfied for type 1 profiles if
we call a cluster of x on the edge of Q(k). Condition (28) is satisfied for type 2 profiles if
where B 2 ⊂ Q(k) is the set of agents that play x. • Type 3: Some combination of clusters of x within and on the edge of Q(k). Condition (28) is satisfied for type 3 profiles if the collection of conditions corresponding to type 1 and 2 segments within Q(k) are satisfied. We will now provide a minimal construction of the adversary set S y that ensures (28) is satisfied for all types. First,
Define the sets W 1 and W 2 as follows:
where w = max{j : j ∈ Q(k)/(
We claim the resulting adversary set satisfies the conditions (29) and (30) . Starting with type 2 profiles, suppose i ∈ B 2 . The number of adversaries that influence B 2 is given by α|B 2 | +1, which clearly satisfies (30) . Alternatively, suppose i + |L k | − 1 ∈ B 2 . The number of adversaries influencing B 2 is at least
since when w / ∈ B 2 , B 2 ⊂ S y . When w ∈ B 2 , {w, i + |L k | − 1} ∈ S y in addition to the nodes in W 1 . Both of these cases satisfy (30) .
We now verify type 1 profiles are satisfied as well. The number of adversaries in B 1 can be lower bounded by taking the difference in the number of adversaries that influence the group B 2 and B 2 , where B 2 is the group that contains agent i and has the same largest index as B 1 and B 2 is the largest group that contains agent i but does not contain any agents that are in B 1 :
The size of B 1 is given by taking the difference between B 2 and B 2 . Thus,
This satisfies (29) for all B 1 . Thus, S y satisfies all conditions set forth in (29) and (30) . The size of S y is bounded by |S y | ≤ α|L k | +3. This does not necessarily satisfy (25) , so additional adversaries need to be added to arbitrary indices within Q(k) until S y is of sufficient size.
Based on Lemmas A.1 and A.2, the lengths of stabilizable segments must satisfy
With a full adversarial budget γ = 1, we can deduce the minimum efficiency that is possible.
Lemma A.3. For α ∈ (0, 1) and γ = 1, the minimal efficiency possible is
where l * y := min{l ∈ Z ≥0 : l ≥ α(l + 1) + 3}. Proof. The minimum efficiency occurs when the strings of agents playing x and y are as short as possible. The shortest strings can only be stabilized when the agents are under full adversarial influence. By Lemma A.1, the shortest string of x is two agents long. The shortest y string l * y that is stabilizable given α is derived from (25) . An action profile consisting only of these segments yields an efficiency given by (37).
We now turn to investigating efficiencies of stabilizable action profiles for γ < 1. Without loss of generality, we can write a = {H 1 , . . . , H M } where each H j := L 2j−1 L 2j with L 2j−1 = X and L 2j = Y . The vector x ( y ) is constructed by iterating through j = 1, . . . , M and appending the number |L 2j−1 | (|L 2j |) if the pattern of H j is unique from all the ones previously searched. The number of times the particular pattern H j appears in a is stored in the the repetition vector r. The efficiency of an action profile given x , y , and r is
For the given x and y , define the vector s of identical length, where
Given a budget γ, s k is the difference between the adversaries available to a partition described by [ x ] k and [ y ] k and the minimum number of adversaries needed to ensure the stochastic stability of that partition (Lemma A.2).
Lemma A.4. Let action profile a be described by some x , y , r, and s satisfying r s > 0. Then there exists another profile a with surplus and repetition vectors satisfying r s = 0, and η(a ) < η(a).
the LHS uses def. (3)).
A new action profile a can be constructed by repeating this additional segment − b c times each time a is repeated, resulting in the following vectors:
From this, a new s can be constructed satisfying r s = 0. The efficiency of a can be expressed as a mediant sum. Lemma A.4 implies that the minimum efficiency action profile necessarily satisfies r s = 0, and that s k < 0 for some index k.
Lemma A.5. The length of the vectors x and y corresponding to a minimum efficiency action profile is at most two. That is, at most two different lengths of groups of agents playing x and two different lengths of groups of agents playing y will be repeated in the minimum efficiency action profile.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that if an action profile a 1 with x 1 = ( x1 , x2 , x3 ), y 1 = ( y1 , y2 , y3 ) and s 1 = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ), s 1 > 0, s 2 , s 3 < 0 there exists another action profile a 2 or a 3 with x 2 = ( x1 , x2 ) and y 2 = ( y1 , y2 ) or x 3 = ( x1 , x3 ) and y 3 = ( y1 , y3 ) that has an efficiency at least as low as that of a 1 . Define p z = yz −1+(1+α)( xz −1) and z = xz + yz . We know that for a 1 to be the minimum efficiency profile, we must have ( r 1 ) s 1 = 0. Under this condition, we can write:
. (42) For the other two action profiles a 2 and a 3 , we know that r 2 and r 3 satisfy ( r i ) s i = 0. From this, we can write
.
(43) We can see that η(a 1 ) is a mediant sum of weighted values η(a 2 ) and η(a 3 ). Hence, either η(a 2 ) or η(a 3 ) is less than or equal to η(a 1 ). This result can be expanded to show that for any stabilizable action profile that is made up of multiple subsets with s m ≥ 0 and multiple subsets with s m < 0, there exists an action profile with lower efficiency made up of just two kinds of the subsets in the original action profile.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Due to Lemma A.5, the search for a minimal efficiency configuration that is stochastically stable can be restricted to a search over four lengths: x1 , y1 , x2 , and y2 (two of segments of x, two of y) that no less than the lengths specified in Lemma A.3, the constraints on adversary set size, and complete adversary utilization r s = 0 (Lemma A.4). The resulting efficiency is of the form of (43).
APPENDIX B STATIC UNINFORMED ADVERSARIES
This section is devoted to proving Theorem 4.1. Since the adversary does not know the interactions between agents, it cannot strategically place impostors along the ring. It effectively can only select the sizes k x = |S x |, k y = |S y | (satisfying k x + k y ≤ k), whereupon a best-case adversary set S xy is arranged along a ring graph (11) . The adversary's performance metric is therefore equivalent to 
where G ∈ R n is any ring graph. In the large agent limit, the adversary selects proportions γ x , γ y ≥ 0 such that γ x + γ y = γ. The following Lemma establishes how sparse y impostor allocations can be such that x is still the stochastically stable state.
m2 is rational and γ ≤ α. Let n = rm 2 for any positive integer r, and define the sets P k = {(k − 1)m 2 + 1, (k − 1)m 2 + 2, . . . , km 2 } for k = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Consider the set of indices
(45) and the adversary set S xy that satisfies S x = ∅ and S y ∩P k = I(γ) − (k − 1)m 2 for each k = 1, 2, . . . , r. Then |Sy| n = γ and the stochastically stable state is x.
Proof. Due to γ ≤ α, we obtain φ( x; S xy ) ≥ φ( y; S xy ). In order for any y segment to stabilizable, the conditions (29) and (30) must be met. However, the adversary placements (45) ensures these conditions are never met.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first assume the adversary only chooses y impostors: γ x = 0 and γ y = γ. After characterizing adversary sets that achieve the efficiencies in (13) for 1) γ ≤ α and 2) γ > α, we show having γ x > 0 results in an efficiency greater than η SU (α, γ) in each case. 1) Suppose γ ≤ α, where γ is a rational number. The influence set described in Lemma B.1 ensures the budget constraint is met and x is the stochastically stable state. 2) Suppose γ > α. It is no longer possible for x to remain stable under the placement scheme of (45). It is possible to stabilize one y and one x segment by allocating all impostors to a single contiguous segment. Thus, a proportion γ of the network plays y and the other 1 − γ play x. This gives an efficiency strictly larger than 1 1+α . However, we show it is possible to obtain an even higher efficiency by reallocating a portion of imposters from this y segment to the rest of the network. We show the adversary can take off up to n α(1−γ) 1−α impostors from the segment while keeping the rest of the network stable to x.
Consider an influence set that allocates a y impostor to every agent in {1, 2, . . . , M }, where M n = γ − α(1−γ) 1−α . It is understood here than n (and consequently M ) is chosen large enough such that the segment is stable to y. Note the proportion α(1−γ) 1−α of the entire network is the proportion α of the remaining network of n − M agents. The adversary allocates its remaining α(1−γ) 1−α fractional budget to the remaining network in the fashion described in (45). By Lemma B.1, the n − M agents play x in the stochastically stable state. This configuration induces the maximal attainable efficiency because no proportion of the entire network less than γ − α(1−γ) 1−α can be stable to y while the rest are stable to x. If γ x > 0, converting any of the y impostors to x in case 1) does not change x as the stochastically stable state. In case 2), converting y impostors that influence the single y segment results in more agents that play x, thus increasing the efficiency.
APPENDIX C REVIEW OF REGULARLY PERTURBED MARKOV PROCESSES

AND RESISTANCE TREES
The Markov process induced by log-linear learning dynamics with a dynamic adversarial policy belongs to a class of regularly perturbed Markov processes [26] , [27] . One can think of it as a noisy best-response dynamic where agents make suboptimal choices with a small probability. Potential game arguments cannot be used to analyze the stochastically stable states in this general setting. We rely instead on the theory of resistance trees, which we briefly review here. A detailed review can be found in [26] . Definition 1. A Markov process with transition matrix P defined over state space A and parameterized by a perturbation ∈ (0,¯ ] for some¯ > 0 is a regular perturbation of the process P 0 if it satisfies: 1) P is aperiodic and irreducible for all ∈ (0,¯ ]. 2) lim →0 + P (a, a ) → P 0 (a, a ) for all a, a ∈ A.
3) If P (a, a ) > 0 for some ∈ (0,¯ ] then there exists r(a, a ) ≥ 0 such that
Here, r(a, a ) is referred to as the resistance of transition a → a .
The log-linear learning process is a regularly perturbed process with error parameter = e −β . The transition graph of P is a directed graph Γ = (A, E) whose nodes are the elements of A and the edge (a, a ) ∈ E if and only if P (a, a ) > 0.
The weights of such edges are given by the resistances r(a, a ) . The resistance of a path ζ = (z 1 → z 2 → · · · → z n ) is the sum of resistances along the state transitions:
Denote the recurrent classes of the unperturbed process P 0 as
A recurrent class satisfies the following. 1) For all a ∈ A, there is a zero resistance path from a to E k for some k ∈ {1, . . . , N }. 2) For all k ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and all a, a ∈ E k , there exists a zero resistance path from a to a and from a to a. 3) For all a, a with a ∈ E k for some k ∈ {1, . . . , N } and a / ∈ E k , r(a, a ) > 0. One can also consider another directed transition graphΓ = ({E i } N i=1 , K) whose nodes are the N recurrent classes. In this graph, all edges exist, i.e. the edge (E i , E j ) ∈ K ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Edge (E i , E j ) is weighted by ρ ij , defined as the resistance of the lowest resistance path in Γ starting from E i and ending in E j :
where P(i → j) denotes the set of all paths in Γ starting at i and ending at j. Let T k be the set of all spanning trees rooted at node k ∈ {1, . . . , N }. That is, an element of T ∈ T k is a directed graph with N − 1 edges such that there is a unique path from j to k, for every j = k. The resistance R(T ) of the rooted tree T is the sum of resistances ρ ij on the N − 1 edges that compose it. Define ψ k := min
as the stochastic potential of recurrent class E k . We will use the following result to identify stochastically stable states.
Theorem C.1 (from [26] 
APPENDIX D DYNAMIC INFORMED ADVERSARIES
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 5.2. The approach we take is to first show one can construct a policy that stabilizes the profile a = arg min a∈A {η(a) : a ∈ LLL(G, α, π) for some π ∈ Π DI } (51) with minimal budget. We can then use this policy to stabilize an action profile giving minimal efficiency under any parameter α, γ. The search for this action profile follows similar lines as the arguments outlined in Appendix A -the difference here is the same action profiles can be stabilized with fewer impostors than a static informed policy.
In the following, we propose a dynamic policy that satisfies these properties. This "aggressive policy" is designed to stabilize a target action profile. After defining this policy, we can exploit its properties to establish the preceding claims.
A. The aggressive adversarial policy
We propose a dynamic policy that aims to stabilize a target profile in the graphical coordination game played over a ring graph. It is a state-dependent policy -the influence set depends on the current action profile S xy (t) = S xy (a(t)). It comprises of strategies applied to disjoint segments of the target profile. The proposed policy consists of "offensive" and "defensive" strategies that applied to segments with a desired convention, x or y. The purpose of applying an offensive x or y strategy is to restore a segment to the convention specified. The purpose of applying a defensive strategy is to keep the segment at that convention. That is, it only applies impostors if the chain is two agents long. If there is more than one such chain, only one is selected.
In forthcoming proofs, we will show x impostors are not necessary to stabilize x segments when α > 1 2 . Definition 4. (Offensive y strategy). An offensive y strategy on [u, v] is defined similarly to an offensive x strategy. In Definition 2, the agents that play y in the profile a are reversed to play x and vice versa, and the x adversaries are replaced with y adversaries. As in Appendix A, we write a = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L m }, where the segments alternate between X and Y . To indicate the segment's type, we say L i = Y or L i = X. Let Q(i) be the indices of the agents whose actions correspond to L i . To describe another profile a relative to a, we say the segment Q(i) (i ∈ {1, . . . , m}) is homogeneous in a if a j = a k for all j, k ∈ Q(i). We say a is homogeneous if every segment is homogeneous. We say a segment is heterogeneous if it is not homogeneous. Definition 6. (Aggressive policy targeting a). An aggressive policy targeting a = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L m } is a state-dependent policy with the following properties. Let a ∈ A be any profile.
(a) (Offensive strategies) At most one offensive strategy is applied to a single segment at any time.
• If a is not homogeneous, an offensive x (y) strategy is applied to the heterogeneous segment Q(i) with lowest index i, where L i = X (Y ). • If a is homogeneous, an offensive x (y) strategy is applied to the segment Q(i) of lowest index i satisfying a Q(i) = Y and L i = X (a Q(i) = X and L i = Y ). • No offensive strategy is applied if neither of the two above situations occur in a . Offensive strategies are not applied to any other segment. (b) (Defensive y strategies) For any a ∈ A, defensive y strategies are applied to each segment Q(i) with L i = Y . (c) (Defensive x strategies) Letˆ be the vector that contains the lengths of all x segments L i , sorted by increasing length, i.e.ˆ 1 ≤ˆ 2 ≤ · · · . Let λ := arg min j j :
A defensive x strategy is applied to the first λ segments where L i = X and whose lengths are given by {ˆ } λ k=1 . Recall that x impostors are only allocated when the longest chain of agents playing x in a segment is two.
Property (c) limits the number of segments a defensive x strategy can be applied to at any given time. the allocation of impostors in each segment L k according to an aggressive policy. The following result specifies how many impostors are needed for an aggressive policy.
Lemma D.1. The minimum budget γ needed to implement an aggressive policy based on a is
where k y is the number of y segments in a and k x is the number of x segments of length 2.
Proof. Let us first consider the case α ≤ 1 2 . We need to find max a ∈A |S xy (a )|. Two impostors are needed for each y segment in order to implement defensive y strategies. Moreover, two impostors are needed for each x segment of length 2. Two impostors are also needed to implement defensive x strategies for λ−k x x-segments of length greater than 2. However, when one of these segments is in active defense, there is necessarily a neighboring y segment that does not utilize both y impostors. Consequently, these x segments only need one dedicated impostor, as they can borrow the second from its neighbor y segment when needed. One additional impostor is needed for an offensive strategy. Therefore, 2(k y + k x ) + (λ − k x ) + 1 impostors are needed to implement an aggressive policy.
In the case α > 1 2 , by Definition 3, no x impostors are needed for defense. Therefore, only 2k y + 1 impostors are needed for defensive y strategies and one offensive strategy.
Since we need only consider stabilizable action profiles a with the properties given in Lemma A.5 to evaluate η MI (α, γ), the profile a is repeated an infinite number of times. This preserves the efficiency of a. Then, the adversarial budget necessary is lim m→∞
B. Proof of Theorem 5.2
Our first goal is to show that an aggressive policy targeting a ∈ A renders a as the stochastically stable state. We then need to show that any other policy that achieves this does so with more adversaries than the aggressive policy. The types of profiles a that are stabilizable with the adversarial budget available for the aggressive policy thus form the basis of the optimization problem of Theorem 5.2. We first deduce the number of impostors needed for an aggressive policy.
Under log-linear learning, states transition via unilateral agent deviations. If profiles a 1 and a 2 differ by agent i's deviation, the resistance is
(56) To more conveniently discuss resistances between action profiles, we introduce the following notation that denotes the resistance of a unilateral deviation. Suppose in profile a 1 , an agent i plays z ∈ {x, y}, has b ∈ {0, 1, 2} neighbors also playing z, and is influenced by an impostor of type s ∈ {x, y, ∅}. Let a 2 be the profile in which i unilaterally deviates to {x, y} \ z. Then
(57) We will refer to different types of unilateral deviations using the function ω. Next, we deduce properties of the alternating segment lengths in a stabilizable target profile a.
Lemma D.2. If the target profile a is stochastically stable under its aggressive policy, then • all X segments of a are of length 2 or greater. • all Y segments of a are of length 1+2α 1−α + 1 or greater. The exception 1+2α 1−α or greater may apply for a zeromeasure subset of α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Suppose (a i−1 , a i , a i+1 ) = (y, x, y) for some agent i. Regardless of what adversarial policy is applied, there is a zero resistance path out of a. Specifically, r(a → a ) = 0 where a i = y and a −i = a −i . The least resistant path from a to a is 1 − α > 0, possible if and only if i ∈ S x (a ). Hence, a is not a recurrent class and therefore is not stochastically stable.
Suppose a has a segment L i = Y and |Q(i)| ≤ 1+2α 1−α . Let a be the similar profile with a Q(i) = x Q(i) . Note that a is a recurrence class. When the aggressive policy applies an offensive strategy on Q(i), the minimum resistance path starting from a and ending in a is given by ρ a ,a = ω(x, 2, y) + ω(x, 1, y)(|Q(i)| − 1) = 1 + 2α. (58)
The minimum resistance path starting from a and ending in a consists of |Q(i)| − 1 transitions of type ω(y, 1, y) = 1 − α.
Hence,
(59) The above is met with equality, i.e. ρ a,a = 1+2α, if and only if α = n−2 n+1 and |Q(i)| = n for n = 2, 3, . . .. Let T be the minimum resistance tree rooted in a, and note that the edge (a , a) is necessarily part of T . Consider the tree T rooted in a by replacing the edge (a , a) from T with (a, a ). If (59) is not met with equality, then T has strictly lower stochastic potential than T and therefore a is not stochastically stable.
Henceforth, we only consider target profiles a with properties given by Lemma D.2.
We will denote particular portions of a homogeneous action profile a with brackets | x and | y that separate the segments based on the target profile a. For instance, |X| x X| y refers to the actions of agents in an action profile for two consecutive segments with all agents playing x in the first as well as the second. The subscripts convey that agents play x in the target profile a in the first segment and y in the second segment. We will often compare two homogeneous action profiles that differ only in one segment, and term the two profiles similar.
The following result characterizes the segment structure of recurrent classes in the Markov process.
Lemma D.3. Consider the regularly perturbed process induced by an aggressive policy targeting a. Then the recurrence classes of the process are the homogeneous action profiles that do not contain an instance of |X| y Y | x .
Proof. We can disqualify any action profile a 1 having at least one heterogeneous segment from being a recurrent class. The reason is that an offensive policy allows a zero resistance path from a 1 to a 2 , where a 2 Q(i) = L i for any segment L i in which a is heterogeneous. Furthermore, the resistance of any path from a 2 back to a 1 is necessarily non-zero.
Thus, recurrent classes must be homogeneous profiles. Observe any homogeneous profile containing an instance of |X| y Y | x has a zero-resistance path to a profile where that instance is replaced by |X| y X| x . This is because an aggressive policy applies an offensive x strategy on the Y | x segment. Any homogeneous profile that does not contain an instance of |X| y X| x is necessarily composed of instances of
Under an aggressive policy, there are no zero-resistance paths out of any of these segment patterns.
We can thus focus our attention to homogeneous action profiles of the form described in Lemma D.3 as candidates for stochastically stable states, which includes the target profile a itself. Let us denote A R ⊂ A as the set of recurrent classes. Observe that a ∈ A R . Next, we classify particular transitions between similar recurrent classes and calculate the minimum resistances between them.
Lemma D.4. Consider the following transitions between two similar recurrent classes a 1 , a 2 ∈ A R . If the transition is
Proof. 1) When an aggressive policy implements an offensive x strategy on the middle segment L i = X, a path from a 1 to a 2 consists of |L i | unilateral switches from y to x, the first of which requires ω(y, 2, x) = 1 − α resistance. The rest switch with resistance ω(y, 1, x) = 0. The resistance of any other path necessarily is greater than 1 − α (e.g. when the middle segment is not selected for an offensive strategy).
2) The least resistant path occurs when an offensive y strategy is applied to the middle segment Q(i), and the agents along the segment sequentially switch. This path requires one deviation of type ω(x, 2, y) = 1 + 2α, and the other |Q(i)| − 1 deviations of type ω(x, 1, y) = 0. 3) A defensive y strategy is applied to the middle segment Q(i). The path ζ in which each agent sequentially deviates requires |Q(i)| − 1 deviations of type ω(y, 1, y)
Another path requires at least one deviation of an agent in the middle of the segment, which has resistance ω(y, 2, ∅) = 2. Hence, ρ a 1 ,a 2 > 1 + 2α.
4) A transition of this form either
• has at least one deviation of type ω(x, 2, ∅) = 2(1+α).
• has at least one deviation of type ω(x, 1, x) = 1 + 2α. • only has deviations of type ω(x, 1, ∅) = α. The first two have resistances exceeding 1 − α. For the third and if α ≤ 1 2 , the transition can be completed with only ω(x, 1, ∅) deviations by first activating defensive strategies for the λ x-segments of shortest length. This requires λ i=1 (ˆ i − 2) > 1−α α such deviations (recall (54)). Hence, the resistance of this path exceeds 1 − α. If α > 1 2 , no x defenses are ever active, but α > 1 − α.
Every a ∈ A R can be assigned a level of "disagreement" corresponding to how many homogeneous segments differ relative to their counterparts in target profile a:
The next result describes how disagreement decreases along minimum resistance paths between recurrence classes.
Lemma D.5. For the aggressive policy targeting a, consider the graph Σ = (A R , E) formed by connecting recurrent classes through the minimum resistance edge leaving each class. Then Σ consists of a collection of disconnected subgraphs Σ u = (A u , E u ), each one corresponding to a particular recurrence class u. Each subgraph Σ u has the following properties.
• The class u belongs to Σ u , and for every node v = u in A u , there is a unique path from v to u.
We refer to the class u as the head of the subgraph Σ u .
Proof. By Lemma D.3, each recurrent class is a homogeneous action profile not containing an instance of |X| y Y | x . Let
We term this type of edge a "type 0" transition. Now, consider any class a 1 ∈ A R \ A 0 R . The minimum resistance edge leaving a 1 to some a 2 ∈ A R is one of the following types (with resistances due to Lemma D.4).
resistance r 4 (a 1 ) > 1 − α. Then d(a 2 ) = d(a 1 ) + 1. For a 1 = a, the minimum resistance path can only be of type 3 or 4. Thus, the minimum resistance path out of a must increase disagreement. Subsequently, (a, a 2 ) ∈ E and (a 2 , a) ∈ E. To see this, the case (a, a 2 ) being type 4 follows from previous arguments. For the case (a, a 2 ) of type 3, it necessarily holds that r 3 (a 2 ), r 4 (a 2 ) > 1 + 2α. Hence, the edge (a 2 , a) exists and is of type 1.
For classes a 1 = a, it cannot be of type 3. If it is of type 1 or 2, the edge leads either to a class with lower disagreement or a class in A 0 R , which in turn leads to a class with lower disagreement. If a 1 = a has a type 4 edge, r 4 (a 1 ) < 1+2α and the path leads to a class a 2 ∈ A 0 R (with higher disagreement). Subsequently, the minimum resistance edge from a 2 leads back to a 1 with a type 0 edge.
We can thus deduce for each class u = a that has a type 4 edge, there is a corresponding subgraph Σ u ⊂ Σ that has the following properties. All edges in E u except the edge leaving u lead to a class that either has lower disagreement or has an edge connecting to another class with lower disagreement. Consequently, u has the lowest disagreement of all classes in Σ u , i.e. u = arg min a ∈Au d(a ).
An illustration of a subgraph Σ u is shown in Figure 4 (left) . Note that the rooted tree on a subgraph Σ u with minimal stochastic potential is given by Σ u without the edge (u, v). To consider rooted trees on the entire set A R , we identify the minimal resistance edges leaving each subgraph Σ u . Proof. We first observe that any edge e u ∈ arg min a 1 ∈Au,a 2 / ∈Au ρ a 1 ,a 2 must be of type 1 or 2. This is because the edge of type 1 out of u has resistance 1 + 2α, so e u must incur a resistance no greater than 1 + 2α. This disqualifies e u to be of type 3. Type 4 is also disqualified because the only occurence of a type 4 edge is between u and v for some v ∈ A u . Hence, if e u is type 1, a minimal resistance path leaving Σ u leaves from the head u. The other possibility is e u is of type 2. The head node u has the most instances of |Y | y among all other nodes in A u . This follows from the fact that all edges in E u except the one leaving u are type 0, 1 or 2. Consequently, u has the most instances of |X| y X| x Y | y from which a type 2 transition leaves Σ u . Moreover, such instances appearing in any other class in A u also appears in u. Therefore, if e u is type 2, a minimal resistance path leaving Σ u leaves from the head u.
Whether e u is type 1 or 2, it leads to a class of Σ u that either has lower disagreement or has an edge leading to another class with lower disagreement. Therefore, d(u ) < d(u).
These results give us enough structure about the resistance trees to deduce that a is the unique stochastically stable state.
Proposition D.1. The target profile a is the unique stochastically stable state under an aggressive policy based on a.
Proof. We need to show the rooted tree with minimal stochastic potential is rooted in a (Theorem C.1). Consider each subgraph Σ u detailed in Lemma D.5. By construction, the rooted tree restricted over A u with minimal stochastic potential is rooted in u and has edge set E u \ (u, v). Let T be the rooted tree constructed by connecting all such rooted trees by the minimum resistance edges leaving each head node u = a (Lemma D.6). Since all of these edges connect to different rooted trees with strictly lower disagreement, T must be rooted in a, the class with minimal disagreement.
The tree T has the minimum stochastic potential of all possible rooted trees because each sub-tree is of minimal potential and they are connected using the minimum number of edges. Each such edge is the minimal resistance edge leaving each sub-tree. Altering any edges to root the tree in any class other than a will result in strictly higher potential.
The structure of the minimum potential rooted tree T is illustrated in Figure 4 (right).
Proposition D.2. The policy that induces a as the unique stochastically stable state using the fewest number of impostors is the aggressive policy targeting a.
Proof. Consider a policy S that uses fewer impostors than the aggressive policy S. Let a be a similar profile to a in which an instance of |X| x is replaced by |Y | x . There always exists either an x-segment or y-segment of a in which a defensive strategy is not implemented under S but is under S. First, suppose a is the similar profile to a in which such an |X| x segment is replaced with |Y | x . Then, it is possible to construct a path from a to a using less than λ i=1 (ˆ i − 2) deviations of type ω(x, 1, 0) = α. Hence, the resistance of such a path is strictly less than 1 − α. A minimum resistance path from a back to a has R ≥ 1 − α. It consists of at least one transition of type ω(y, 2, x) = 1 − α or ω(y, 2, ∅) = 2.
Now suppose a is similar to a in which such a |Y | y segment is replaced with |X| y . A minimal path has zero resistance, since it uses only deviations of type ω(y, 1, 0) = 0. In a similar manner, any path from a back to a has resistance R ≥ 1 + 2α > 0.
Consider the minimum resistance tree rooted at a. If we reroot the tree at a by changing only the edge between a and a , we end up with a rooted tree with less stochastic potential. Therefore, a cannot be stochastically stable under S .
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We are now ready to pose the optimization (17) that searches for the minimum efficiency profile a that is stabilizable with an aggressive policy using budget γ. By Lemma D.2, x segments must be length 2 or greater and Y segments must be length 2+α 1−α + 1 or greater. By Propostion D.1, an aggressive policy can stabilize any a with these properties. By Lemma A.5, there are at most 2 different length patterns for x and y segments. By Lemma D.1, there needs to be two impostors for each y segment of any length and x segment of length two when α < 1 2 . When α ≥ 1 2 , there needs to be two impostors for every y segment in a and no x impostors are needed.
Since the aggressive policy is a deterministic policy that stabilizes a target action profile with the fewest number of impostors (Proposition D.2), randomization cannot contribute to further lower the efficiency. The optimization problem to find η DI (α, γ) is posed as a modified version of (14) with adjusted surplus constants s k .
APPENDIX E DYNAMIC UNINFORMED ADVERSARY
Similar to the static uninformed case (Appendix B), the uninformed adversary here effectively can only select how many x and y impostors to allocate at each time step, and cannot place them in a strategic manner. The major difference here is it can also randomize among influence sets by selecting different distributions at each time step. The idea of the proof is by being able to probabilistically attach an impostor to every node in the network, the all y profile can be stabilized independently of the budget γ. Let S y (t) (S x (t)) be the y impostor set that is applied at time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . for a dynamic uninformed policy π.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let us define Π * ⊂ Π DU as a type of dynamic uninformed policies that have the following properties. Suppose π ∈ Π * . Then (a) |S x (t)| = 0 and |S y (t)|/n = γ for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. (b) for any i ∈ N and t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., there exists a 0 ≤ τ < ∞ such that Pr(i ∈ S y (t + τ )) > 0. (c) there exists a subset T ⊂ N of agents satisfying |T | n = γ < γ for all n, such that Pr(i ∈ S y (t)) = 1 for all i ∈ T , t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Property (a) asserts the adversary never uses x impostors. Property (b) ensures any given agent is influenced by a y impostor infinitely often. Property (c) says the adversary determistically influences a fixed fraction of agents in the network. In a sense, policies belonging to Π * are "partially static". We will show η * (π) := max if π ∈ Π DU \ Π * (63) In other words, any policy in Π * achieves the minimal efficiency among all dynamic uninformed policies.
For any π ∈ Π * , the log-linear learning dynamics induces an ergodic Markov chain. Consider any profile a / ∈ { y, x}. There exists a zero-resistance path such that agents constituting any x segment in a switch to y. This is due to the fact there is a positive probability any given agent is influenced by a y impostor in a finite time. An agent i playing a i = x with one x and one y neighbor switches to y with zero resistance if i ∈ S y (t). We then have ρ a, y = 0 while ρ y,a > 0. Also, ρ a, x ≥ 0 with equality if a i = x for all i ∈ T , while ρ x,a > 0. Since there is a zero-resistance path from a to either y or x, and any path out of either y or x has positive resistance, x and y are the only recurrence classes.
Regardless of how the agents of T are arranged in the ring graph, the minimum path resistances between x and y are ρ y, x = 2 + (1 − α)(|T | − 1) and ρ x, y = 1 + 2α. For α < 1 2 , ρ y, x > ρ x, y . For α ∈ 1 2 , 1 , a sufficiently large n (and hence |T |), still ensures ρ y, x > ρ x, y . Therefore, y is the stochastically stable state for any gain α ∈ (0, 1) and any budget γ ∈ (0, 1] under a π ∈ Π * . This gives η * (π) = 1 1+α . We now show any π ∈ Π DU \Π * cannot induce an efficiency η * (π) < 1 1+α . • Suppose π satisfies property (a) and (c), but not (b). Then there is a set B ⊂ N of agents that are never influenced by y impostors: Pr(i ∈ S y (t)) = 0 for all i ∈ B and t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Suppose |B| ≥ 2. Consider a ring network that arranges B as one contiguous segment, and T as another. The collection of profiles E ⊂ A that satisfy a B = x and a T = y constitutes a recurrence class. The profiles x and y are the other two recurrence classes. Similar resistance arguments show that E has minimal stochastic potential, and hence LLL(G, α, π) = E. The profile a = (y T , x −T ) achieves the maximal efficiency, which gives η * (π) > 1 1+α for n sufficiently large. For |B| = 1, E is not a recurrence class. The same analysis for π ∈ Π * applies in this case, giving η * (π) = 1 1+α . • If π satisfies (a) and (b) but not (c), there are no static impostors. There are no recurrence classes other than y and x. We obtain ρ x, y = 1 + 2α and ρ y, x = 2. For α < 1 2 , y is stable and for α ≥ 1 2 , x is stable. This gives η * (π) ≥ 1 1+α . • If π satisfies only (a), x and y are the only recurrence classes. One can show ρ x, y = 1 + 2α + (|B| − 1)α and ρ y, x = 2. If |B| > α −1 − 1, ρ x, y > ρ y, x , which gives η * (π) = 1. If not, then y is stochastically stable, giving η * (π) = 1 1+α
• Any policy that does not satisfy property (a) induces an efficiency at least as much as a corresponding policy that does. The addition of x impostors only lessens the resistance of transitions from y to x. Also, if an x impostor is "static", property (c) allows a single segment to be stable to x. For any number of x impostors that are "random" in the sense of property (b), the adversary cannot stabilize alternating x and y segments in a repeating fashion. Therefore, no induced efficiency for large n can be less than 1 1+α .
